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THE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM IN THE USSR
A. THE SYSTEM
I. The Communications Revolution in the USSR: Expansion
Since the death of Stalin a veritable revolution in the system of
mass communications took place in the USSR.1 The revolution entailed two
basic aspects: (a) a revolutionary expansion of communications networks,
(b) a meaningful change in the role of the media, of their impact on the
authorities and on the population.2 Both aspects are reviewed in newly
available statistical material3 and in the evidence from recent emigres.
As can be seen from the adjoining Table No. 1 communications expan-
sion was very rapid. In 1950 only two television stations were functioning
in the USSR -- the same number as in 1940. By 1973 the number reached
1620; of these, 130 were program-initiating stations and the rest relay
stations. The total number of television sets in the USSR amounted to
10,000 in 1950. By 1960 it was almost 5 million and in 1974 more than
55 million. The data for radio sets were 3.5 million, almost 28 million,
and more than 60 million, respectively.5 In 1960 less than half of the
Soviet families had a radio or radiogram, and only 8 in a hundred had a TV
set. In 1973 the figures stood at 74 and 67, respectively. This means
that, despite rapid progress, one quarter still had no radio set (though
probably a wired loud-speaker) and one third had no TV set.6 Production
of television sets was 11,900 in 1950 and about 6,271,000 in 1973; for
radio sets the figures were 1,072,000 and 8,165,000, respectively. The
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total daily output of Soviet radio stations amounts to 1,500 hours. Broad-
casting is conducted in 128 languages (58 of Soviet peoples and 70 foreign).
In 1974 305 cities in the USSR received the Central television programs,
including 103 cities receiving them in color. This was made possible by the
creation of the "Orbita" systems which consists of at least four simultaneously
working "Molniya" communications satellites combined with some 40 receiving
stations. The nine communist countries of the Soviet sphere of influence
also created the Inter-sputnik system which utilizes Soviet space and
communications equipment. The first station of the system was completed
in 1970 in the Mongolian Peoples Republic. Additional stations were
inaugurated in Cuba (1973) and in Czechoslovakia (April 1974). For mobile
TV broadcasting the USSR operates one "Mars" station located in two
airplanes. 8
The parameters of the communications revolution are also clearly
9
seen from data about the other areas of communication. The total number
of telephones jumped from 2.3 million in 1940 to more than 13.2 million
in 1972. Even more decisive was the jump in home telephones (as different
from office telephones) in urban areas which is significant because in
Stalin's time the telephone network was developed to serve almost exclusively
the needs of the official institutions. Their number went up from 338,000
in 1950 to 3,768,000 in 1970, almost eleven times. Nevertheless, in the
area of home telephones the USSR remained greatly "underdeveloped". Even
in 1970 the home telephones were only a little more than a third of the
total; assuming that the number of urban families in 1970 was about 35
million, it appears that only one in ten had a telephone. This figure
should perhaps be upgraded because in the Soviet houses often several
families occupy one large apartment; also telephones are sometimes installed
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in corridors for the common use of several apartments. The total number
of telephonesin rural areas amounted to 221,000 in 1950 and rose to 1,483,000
in 1970. A private telephone in a home in the country is a rarity in the
USSR. Even if we assume the same ratio of home telephones as in urban
areas -- i.e., one third or about 0.5 million -- and since the number of
rural families is 24.7 million, the result is one telephone per 50 families
in the rural areas. Yet, there was a great change in the telephone connection
of agricultural enterprises. Whereas in 1950 almost 80% of all kolkhozy and
22.5% of all sovkhozy were without telephone connections altogether, by
1970 only 0.2% in both categories were in that situation. This was the
USSR average. In some republics, however, the situation was still rather
difficult. In the Tadzhik Republic 4.5% of sovkhozy were without a
telephone, and in the Turkman Republic almost 10%.
The divergence between urban and rural areas was also clear in
regard to television sets. Though the rural population amounted to 45%
of the total, only slightly more than a quarter of the television sets were
in the rural areas (9.4 million in rural areas versus 25.4 in urban areas).
Assuming the number of rural and urban families as indicated above, there
were less than three sets per ten families in rural areas and more than
seven sets per ten families in urban areas.10
During the period of 1950-1973 the total letters handled rose
almost 3.5 times; of telegrams, more than 216 times and the number of inter-
urban telephone calls went up almost six times. The total number of commun-
ications enterprises (post offices, telephone stations, etc.) rose by more
than two thirds. The personnel employed at all enterprises of the Ministry
of Communications rose from 512,000 in 1950 to 1,300,000 in 1970,
more than 2.5 times. The actual figure of all those employed in the
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communications system in the USSR is probably higher by at least one fifth
since there are communications enterprises which do not belong to the
Ministry of Communications. For example, the total number of telephones
for 1971 is given at 12.1 million, whereas "the total number of telephones
of all agencies" is given as 15.1 million.1 1 If this estimate is right,
the total of those employed in the communications system in the USSR
(including those in the military, security, administrative, and economic
organizations which are not included under the Ministry of Communications)
amounts to more than 15 million in 1970. The data also reflect considerable
progress in the technology of communications. The tonnage of airmail grew
about twelve times between 1970 and 1973; the number of automatic telephones
grew 15 times. In 1955 there were almost no postal machines and no mail-
sorting machines; in 1970 the former amounted to 31,000 and the latter to
14,500. During the same time, the number of loading and unloading machines
grew about 7.5 times. From 1950 to 1973 the total product of the communi-
cations system (excluding print media) in the USSR rose almost six times.
From 1960 to 1970 alone the total yearly income rose by more than three
quarters.
As for print media, their extension was also very rapid. In the
period of 1950-1973 the yearly circulation of journals went up almost 17
times; of newspapers, 5 times and of books, almost twice. The number of
films produced rose almost 7 times (from 36 to 245 per year). Cinema
attendance also rose from 6 to 18 average attendances per person in a
12
year.
The indices in the last two columns in Table No. 1 show the tempo
of the communications expansion in the USSR. While the most rapid expansion
went on in the 1950-1960 period, a high tempo was sustained in certain areas
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in the 1960-1973 period such as: TV sets (per family and totals), delivery
of Pravda on publication date, interurban telephone calls and airmail delivery.
The total product grew more than three times during this period.
TABLE No. 1
Expansion of Communication Networks in the USSR, 1950-1973
1950 1960 1970 1973
1973: 1973
:1950 :1960
General
0.7
512
51
2607
29
154
n.d.
2313
221
872
87
77
21
103
13.3
3.6
9.7
0.01
Total product (excluding print-media, in
billions of rubles)
Personnel in the main activities of the
Ministry of Communications (,000)
Number of communications enterprises (post
offices, telephone stations, etc.) (,000)
Letters - total (in millions)
Airmail (,000 tons)
Telegrammes (in millions)
Mail-sorting machines (number)
Number of telephones **(,000)
including: in rural areas (,000)
automatic phones (,000)
Rural localities with telephones (%)
rural Soviets
state farms (sovkhozy)
collective farms (kolkhozy)
Interurban telephone calls (millions)
Number of broadcast receiving units (mlns)
including: radio sets
radio loudspeakers (mlns)
television sets
Number of TV stations-relay and programme
initiating
Families with: radio or radiogram (%)
TV set (%)
1.3
731
63
4171
147
241
2716
4301
458
2201
98
98
97
185
63.4
27.8
30.8
4.8
275
46
8
3.3
1301
81
8020
324
365
14409
10987
1483
9471
99
99.8
99.8
431
129.6
48.6
46.2
34.8
1233
72
51
4.1
n.d.
85
8714
341
404
n.d.
14463
2013
13116
99.6
99.9
99.9
604
159.5
54.8
55.5
49.2
1620
74
67
5.86 3.15
2.54* 1.78*
1.67
3.34
11.76
2.62
6.25
9.11
15.04
1.14
1.29
4.76
5.86
11.99
15.22
5.72
492.0
801.0
1.35
2.09
2.32
1.66
5.30*
3.36
3.67
5.96
1.02
1.02
1.03
3.26
2.52
1.97
1.80
12.30
5.89
1.61
8.37
2
n.d.
n.d.
Mail and
Telegraph
Telephones
Radio and
T.V.
0"
TABLE No. 1 continued
1950 1960 1970 1973
1973: 1973
:1950 :1960
Book-copies printed: (millions)
Journals " (millions)
Newspapers " (billions)
Percentage of main towns in which Pravda is
delivered on date of publication
Number of films produced
Yearly cinema attendance-per head
821 1240
181 779
7.0 15.0
n.d. 8.6
36 139
6 n.d.
1362
2622
31.2
72.3
218
19
1567
3038
35.3
n.d.
245
18
1.91
16.78
504
1.26
3.90
2.35
-- 8.41
6.81
3.0
1.76
Sources: Transport i svyaz' 1972: 271-277
Nar. khoz. 1922-1972: 313-314, 373; 1973: 531-532, 631
n.d. = no data
*1970 instead of 1973
**Network of the Ministry of Communications only. Together with networks of other agencies, the number
in 1973 was 16,200,000.
Print
Media
Films
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II. The Communications Revolution: Changes in Content and Function
In the Western mind an image of Soviet media was created which
regarded them as merely mouthpieces of the power elite without any leeway
for autonomy or influence. The established Western notions of the USSR
as a totalitarian system, according to the definitions of Ahrendt, Friedrich,
and Brzezinski made it difficult (if not impossible) to envisage Soviet media
as vehicles for some real discussions of problems of Soviet society as well
as agents reflecting particular group interests and attitudes. This percep-
tion was a result of the many years of the Stalinist regime in the USSR,
and of the numerous Soviet pronouncements about the media as "propagandists
and organizers" for the Party.13 Such a view of the role of Soviet media
may have been largely, though not fully, true in Stalin's time. It is no
longer the case.
Parallel to the communications revolution in terms of the immense
expansion of the modern media output in the USSR, another revolution took
place. The latter pertains to a certain basic change in the relationships
between the elements: Public Opinion - Media - Authorities. During the
Stalinist period the main direction of the relationship between these three
elements had been from top to bottom (Authorities - Media - Public Opinion),
with only a small measure of feed-back in the other direction. In the
post-Stalin period a process ensued which opened up possibilities of influence
in the direction: Public Opinion - Media - Authorities, and through the
mutual interchange, Media - Public Opinion, and Media - Authorities. In
this kind of relationship the media acquires an intermediary position between
the other two elements. Another aspect of this process is the considerable
differentiation and autonomy of certain media units as vehicles for particular
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attitudes and group interests. These may be of various kinds: bureaucratic,
local ethnic, national and ideological-political (from "liberal democratic"
communists to neo-Stalinists and Russian nationalists).15
A full discussion of this rather significant development within the
Soviet media (and the system as a whole) would require a major study of its
own and is beyond the scope of the present paper. The following outline of
the major features of this process are given.
Often the changes which occurred in the Soviet Union during the post-
Stalin period were not a result of the initiative of Party leaders or officials,
nor of careful planning based on systematic research. They were rather initiated,
formulated, and often implemented by some influential people and groups working
in the media or at academic institutions. Naturally this occurs in such cases
when these people succeeded in establishing access to people in power and were
capable of convincing them to accept their proposals. Moreover, in the post-
Stalinist period, as the instruments of terror gradually receded into the
background, the instruments of persuasion and mass information gained more and
more in importance. Each person in authority makes considerable effort to
create an intimate relationship with influential media people, and to promote
people of his own into the various media positions. As a result a network of
close contacts is created between the two sets, and a certain symbiosis of
the groups in both media and government. The three outstanding examples of
media-people who made history are Aleksei Adzhubei, Aleksander Tvardovsky
and Aleksander Chakovsky whose careers are relatively well known.16 The
main point to make here is that each of them had a considerable influence on
the political-ideological climate in the USSR and revolutionized the particular
publication of which he was head. The impact of this revolution was of such
momentum that Soviet journalism cannot slip back to the status quo ante.
-10-
The ways through which they reached their appointments were
different, and so were their political attitudes. Adzhubei was named
editor of Izvestia through the influence of Khruschev who was his father-
in-law. Tvardovsky owed his appointment as editor of Novy Mir to his fame
as a poet and writer and to the support of "liberals" in the Writers Union
and in the Party. Chakovsky emerged as the influential editor of Literaturnaya
Gazeta as a result of a reorganization of this paper into a major and greatly
influential weekly for the intelligentsia.17 (Before that, it had appeared
several times a week, in a thin format, as a paper for a narrow literary
readership.)
The reorganization of Literaturnaya Gazeta was not done in accord
with some plan or because of a Party decision; the initiative came rather
from a group of journalists and writers who came forward with the idea and
were able to persuade the authorities to accept it. Following the decision,
a major government sum was invested into a new printing plant and a major
reorganization of the staff was undertaken. To attract talented and re-
sourceful writers, the management was allowed to pay the senior staff
salaries which were considerably higher than those established throughout
the profession. The new weekly also undertook major efforts to enroll the
participation of academic and other specialists as contributors, to under-
take debates on some topical issues of Soviet and international problems.
As a result this weekly still occupies a somewhat unique position in Soviet
journalism. Chakovsky has become a figure of some influence in the Soviet
elite, and a consultant of the top Party bodies. He is a member of the
Central Committee of the Party since 1969.
Adzhubei took over the central government newspaper Izvestia when
it was a grey bureaucratic mouthpiece. He injected into it many of the
methods of operative and competitive Western journalism: a morning and
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afternoon edition, lively and informative commentaries, exclusive corres-
pondence from representatives abroad, critical series about some of the
government agencies, striking banner headlines and subtitles, stress on
readers' letters, new columns answering the personal and family needs of the
readers, as well as a weekend magazine with topical features. The Adzhubei
revolution coincided with the abolition of limitations on subscriptions and
the Izvestia readership went up so swiftly that it put Pravda into the shade.
Tvardovsky used his considerable standing in the Party and his
connections with the elite to make the literary monthly Novy Mir into a
daring journal of social criticism and a tribune for liberalization and
de-Stalinization. Subscriptions to this journal also went up immensely.
Tvardovsky was dismissed by the post-Khruschev leadership under the pressure
of conservative writers in 1971. After the dismissal, the circulation of
Novy Mir went down while the circulation of other journals was going up.
From 165,000 copies in December 1971, the circulation dropped to 155,000 in
1972; assuming that some 120,000 are sold to libraries, enterprises and foreign
subscribers, the drop amounts to almost 20% amongst the individual subscribers
(10,000 out of 45,000).18
During the post-Stalin period some of the main newspapers and journals
in the USSR acquired a rather clear socio-political profile, e.g., Novy Mir
occupied the liberal-democratic wing, whereas another journal of the Union
of Writers, Oktyabr, was the fortress of conservatives and neo-Stalinists.
Izvestia and Literaturnaya Gazeta had a liberal impact despite the fact that
they were managed by establishment figures (Chakovsky is regarded as a con-
servative because he attacks the liberals and dissidents; but his paper also
dares to attack the neo-Stalinists as well as the new-style Russian nation-
alities and Slavophiles). This liberal impact was a result of the critical
and topical journalism which was developed by these papers.
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During a certain period the three papers mentioned above became a must for
every intelligent family in the USSR and their cumulative influence on the
readership was immense. One of the first moves of the post-Khruschev leader-
ship was to remove many of the key media people of the Khruschev period from
their positions and to appoint trusted people of their own in their place.
Amongst those removed were the editors of Izvestia (the above mentioned
Adzhubei) and Pravda, and the heads of state committees for Radio and Tele-
vision, and for the Press. Recent emigres who occupied at that time impor-
tant positions in Soviet media testify that the first clues to the impending
change of leadership came in matters related to media. The central Party
authorities issued instructions to delay the printing of newspapers. Editors
of electronic media were ordered to stand by for some important state news.
At the central radio and television studios in Moscow new guard units arrived
with specially empowered Party-appointed officials who removed the previous
pro-Khruschev chiefs from their offices and took over control. Special de-
tachments were assigned to the central control stations of radio and tele-
vision to prevent their utilization by pro-Khruschev leaders for broadcasting
to the country.1 9
Several studies of the Soviet media undertaken by Western specialists
show that there are considerable differences in the treatment of certain crucial
topics by various Soviet media.20 The prevailing interpretation is that these
result from the personal attitudes of the top people in charge of the parti-
cular medium, as well as group interests related to the function of the
particular medium. For example, the main newspaper of the Ministry of Defense,
Krasnaya Zvezda, is naturally regarded as a mouthpiece of the top military
leadership, whereas Pravda reflects the opinions and decisions of the top
Party leaders and officials. Sometimes, the Party bodies decide to strengthen
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their influence and control in an area of activities by establishing a new
and weighty publication, or by taking over an existing one which is issued
by another body. Until 1972 the newspaper Sovetskaya Kultura had served
as the organ of the Ministry of Culture and had been published in a thin
format several times.a week. In January 1973 it was reorganized by Party
decision into a weekly organ of the CC under A.V. Romanov. It seems that
the Party bodies felt that they need a stronger control in the field of
culture, and they decided to achieve this through taking over the newspaper
and reorganizing it. During the period of debates and experimentation with
regard to the economic reform, the CC decided to publish a weekly on economic
affairs called Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta.2 1
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III. Communication Policy and Decision Making: The Five Year Plan
The Soviet system takes pride in its planned economy which is supposed to be
based on scientific and rational considerations. There is, however, no evidence
that Soviet planners and policy makers base their decisions on communications,
on concepts of an integrated system and on developing an optimal and dynamic
balance between its various components. The scarcity of information and of
studies on Soviet communications prevents a full and detailed analysis of
this subject. However, a general outline based on the available knowledge
from Soviet sources, Western studies and emigre evidence may be in order. 2 2
Formally, there is no supreme national body devoted to planning,
decisions and control of the communications system as a whole. On the
technical side, the closest approximation is the Board of the Ministry of
Communications which is responsible for all communications hardware and
for some of the software and delivery systems all over the USSR. A special
body at the Ministry is presumed to be responsible for regulating the
communications system, including such matters as spectrum allocation,
coordination of technical facilities between media, rate fixing, etc.
Budgetary arrangements and allocations for the communications system are
part of the overall budget planning and execution of the Ministry of
Finance. Supplies for the coamunications system are centrally channelled
through the State Supply Committee (Gossnab). Planning of the Soviet
communications system is part of the overall planning process of the
national economy and of cultural development. It is performed by the State
Planning Committee (Gosplan) which works according to decisions of the
supreme Party bodies and under their close supervision. The latest available
data is included in the State Five Year Plan for the Development of the
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USSR National Economy for 1971-1975 which was approved by CC CPSU on October
12, 1971, and presented to the Supreme Soviet by Prime Minister Kosygin on
November 24, 1971. A decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of
November 26, 1971, gave the plan the status of a national law.2 3
The plan includes a section on the development of communications
and especially about the creation of the "Uniform Automated Communications
System" with the aim of "assuring" the uninterrupted and reliable transmission
of all forms of information. The first portion of the section reviews the
success achieved in the development of communications during the last decade.
The capacity of the telephone stations grew 2.4 times and the number of
powerful television stations grew 2.7 times. The number of television sets
rose 7.3 times (and in the countryside, 25 times). The growth of the cable
and radio relay-lines made possible the lengthening of inter-urban telephone
channels in 1970 by the factor of 2.3 compared with 1965.
During the 1971-1975 plan the total investment in radio, telephone,
television and other forms of communications was to amount to 4.63 billion
rubles. Although 36.3% more than in the previous five years,it was still
relatively small, about $1 billion per year. The strength of radio stations
was to grow 30%. The plan did not say much about the more traditional forms
of communications. With regard to postal services it called for the further
mechanization of loading-unloading operations and the introduction of
automatic sorting and transportation equipment, so as to speed up the pro-
cessing of postal items. 2 4
The section of the Plan dealing with the further development of
culture also began by quoting data about successful development during the
previous Five Year Plan. The total number of radio broadcasting hours
grew by 14.4% and of TV broadcasting hours by 100%; book publishing grew
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by 14.4%, newspaper printing by 40%, and journals by 80%. Such a growth
of the production of newspapers and journals made it possible to dispense
with limitations on subscriptions on the majority of periodical publications
and to supply more fully the needs of the population in books and textbooks.
The planned growth indices for the five year period were as follows: books,
30.1%; journals and newspapers, 20%. A special effort was to be made to
almost double the number of full length films produced, especially films
for television (from 50 in 1970 to 93 in 1975), as well as color films
in general. In 1975 the total number of television broadcasting hours
was to amount to 2,282 hours per day instead of 797 per day in 1965.
The growth in radio broadcasting hours was to be insignificant (a
mere 28.5 hours within a schedule including 1368.5 hours). The Plan
envisaged the further widening of radio relay and cable lines, as well as
construction of a series of TV transmitters. As a result, 75% of the popu-
lation of the country was to be reached by television leaving a quarter
of the population without any television even in 1975. In order to facili-
tate simultaneous printing of central newspapers in a number of main cities
in the country, further arrangements were to be made for "transmission of
printed papers in color through the communications channels". The same
was to be applied to the "decentralized printing of mass circulation
journals". The Plan paid special attention to improving conditions of
local newspapers; more than 300 new buildings for printing shops of local
newspapers were to be built, and existing printing plants were to be modernized.
Altogether during the Five Year Plan the Soviet printing output was to be
doubled, and the stress to be on producing the most modern equipment, photo
and automatic printing. Also the equipment of the existing cinema studios
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was modernized and new studios were contructed. A special effort was made
to produce better color films by newer methods, so as to improve the quality
of the color and the preservation of film copies. 2 5
What are the motivations of Soviet planners, when deciding upon the
development of the Soviet communications network? Do they proceed in a
rational and optimal fashion? Are they aware of the various alternatives
when formulating the Five Year Plan on communications?
Writers on communications have set down several logical stages
necessary for the proper planning and operation of the communication system.
For example Schramm recommends that such proper planning should include
research which would give full information as to all available communications
services, and as to the various needs of the population and the system,
with regard to communication development. He also calls for studies which
will show the relative effectiveness from the investment into one or another
media instrument. 26
From the information available it is not clear whether the Soviets
have taken care of these pre-requisites. The available evidence rather
points to the development and operation of mass media in the USSR according
to ideological criteria and intuitive (common sense) decisions. Prestige
as well as personal group interests are also prime movers in decision making
about communications. Research and study of policy alternatives in the
field of communications are not among the highly developed branches of
Soviet science.2 7
A major factor in the development of the Soviet communications is
the technological example of the West and the competition of Western media
services. 28 Since Western media moved swiftly to new technologies and
provided high-geared, up-to-date, and lively services, the Soviets could
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not remain behind indefinitely. This is especially so since the product
of some of these Western media reaches an ever wider proportion of the
Soviet public in general and of the Soviet elite in particular. The
elegant, multicolored, and well-produced Western journals (e.g. Amerika)
which reach the Soviet public were in such glaring contradiction with the
shoddy, grey, unaesthetic appearance of Soviet journals, that something
had to be done. This was especially necessary with regard to the Soviet
journals and books printed for the West. As a result Soviet publishing
authorities ordered modern materials from abroad. Also the 1971-1975 Five
Year Plan envisages a considerable effort to produce modern printing equip-
ment in the USSR itself.29
Soviet journals such as Zhurnalist and Literaturnaya Gazeta intro-
duced Western styles in layout and writing so as to make the publications
more lively and aesthetically pleasing.30 However, so far such innovations
are only a drop in a sea of old fashioned and shoddy Soviet printing
productions.
According to Western researchers, Soviet emigres and the Soviet
press, the improvement in the liveliness and the topicality of the Soviet
media as a result of competition with the Western media is especially
felt in the field of the news. The goal of the Soviet authorities was to
supply rapidly the news and to engross the Soviet citizen in the Soviet
media output so that he would not have the interest or the time for the
output of the Western media. Since the Soviet media used to be very slow
in bringing news-features unpleasant to the Soviet elite, the Soviet
population learned to tune in to Western media. Sometimes the Western
media had a monopoly on certain news, since Moscow did not mention the
matter for a considerable period. Soviet media has since stressed that a
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certain "psychological advantage!'is accrued to anyone who is first to
transmit a message. Subsequent messages by Soviet media with a Soviet
interpretation met with great difficulty because the first message had
already "sunk in". In the words of one Soviet newspaper: "It is very
important that people are informed in good time and correctly about all
events taking place both in the country and abroad. There must be no gaps
in the information because these may be used by ideological enemies."3 1
As a result, the Soviet authorities made some change in their
system of information: instead of delaying news cleared by the Party
censorship or by Pravda, Soviet media editors have been empowered to
transmit news immediately, subject to clearance by specially empowered
editors at the media themselves. However, though Soviet news prograns
are at present much quicker and livelier than in the past, there still is
a considerable time lag in their news services compared with the Western
media.3 2
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IV. The Soviet Communications System: Ownership and Control
It is generally assumed that the Soviet communications system is
owned and operated by the "government". A careful study and analysis of
the system shows that it is far from being monolithic. The media that
actually reach the Soviet citizen are even more diverse. They are owned
and operated by the following:
a. the Communist Party and its organizations (e.g., the Komsomol)
b. the Government
c. public organizations (e.g., the Writers Union)
d. religious organizations
e. cooperatives (Kolkhoz)
f. private citizens (in the form of Samizdat)
f. foreign bodies (e.g., Amerika, newspapers of foreign Communist
parties, foreign broadcasts).
Even those media which are owned and operated by the "government"
are actually in the hands of a plethora of ministries, administrative units,
economic agencies, cultural and scientific organizations, and military and
security establishments. Each of these institutions has its own personnel,
interests and specific conditions. Moreover within each agency and organ-
ization, the media are owned and operated by diverse sub-units, which again
differ from each other greatly. 3 3
In view of this picture of considerable plurality and diversity,
how does the Soviet system succeed in enforcing the great uniformity in its
information system which is proverbial throughout the world. One answer
would be that this is ensured by a single censorship system which is all
prevading and all powerful, the so-called Glavlit. In fact, control over
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the media involves a number of institutions and procedures:
1. Party control over appointments in media.
2. Party control over all training for the media.
3. Party control over all owners and operators of media
(apart from f and g in the list preceding).
4. The Glavlit censorship agency.
5. Military censorship.
6. Additional censorship agencies for all forms of creative
activity (film studios, theatres).
7. Measures to prevent inflow of unwanted information from
the outside (jamming, border control, postal censorship).
8. The security police and its network of informers.
9. The courts, the prisons and the camps. 4
Since the agencies of control are multiple, there must indeed be
in every area a unit which is the highest controlling and decision making
body. The answer to this cannot be the Party as a whole since it is a
complex body. Within the Party apparatus there are several departments
concerned with media. These are the departments of propaganda, culture,
information, science and higher education and personnel.
The uniform line of command for all forms of media in the USSR is
ensured through the Departments of Propaganda of the Party at all levels
and through their heads, who are directly responsible to the Party secre-
taries, who deal with ideological matters. The latter are subordinate to
the top Party secretary and the appropriate Party bureau at each level.
At the pinnacle it is the First Secretary of the Party CC and the highest
Party bodies which carry the power and responsibility. Decision making and
control of media are also concentrated in the higher state bodies -- the
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government and the Soviets; their standing in these matters is, however,
secondary to that of the supreme Party leaders and bodies. This has been
corroborated by Lenin's detailed instructions and interference in matters
of media, by the well-known instances when Stalin or Khruschev personally
decided on the publication or withdrawal of books, films, plays or paintings. 3 5
Several days after the Bolshevik revolution the Soviet government banned
'all newspapers and journals opposed to the Soviet Power". The decree on
the press of November 20, 1917, was signed by Lenin as Chairman of the
Council of People's Commissars. The decree on establishing the Russian
Telegraphic Agency of September 7, 1918, was signed by Y. Sverdlov, Chair-
man of the All-Russian Executive Committee. The decisions of Party cong-
resses and Central Committee meetings were supreme regulative instruments
obligatory in all matters of communications. For example, the Eighth Party
Congress in March 1919, accepted a resolution "on the Party and Soviet
Press", which outlined some of the principles for the operation of the Soviet
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press.
With the advent of NEP, a period of liberalized economic policies
allowing a measure of private business, the Government decided to allow
private publications (decree of December 12, 1921). They were closed again
with the liquidation of NEP at the end of the "20's".
Traditionally, the Central Committee of the Party publishes detailed
decisions on the matters of media. E. . decision of August 15, 1931, de-
manded that journals should have sections for book-reviews and bibliography.
In 1932, on April 23, the Central Committee decreed a far reaching reorgan-
ization of literary unions. In 1940, when the world was engulfed in a world
war and the German invasion of Russia was not far away, the CC was busy with
a decree which castigated the faults of literary criticism and returned
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again to the matter of review sections in journals.3 7
To facilitate implementation of Party control the Party secretaries
hold regular meetings with the heads of the various media and news agencies.
Usually, the following are present at the meetings called by the
head of the Propaganda Department at the Secretariat of the CPSU in Moscow:
a. the editors of the principal newspapers and magazines
(M. Zimianin - Pravda, L. Tolkunov - Izvestia,
M. Khaldeev - Party Life, P. Naumov - New Times, etc.)
b. the general directors of TASS (I. Zamyatin) and Novosty
(I. Udaltsov)
c. several representatives of the governmental committees
relevant to propaganda, such as S. Lapin, Chairman of the
Radio and TV Committee, B. Stukalin, Chairman of the Publi-
cations Committee, etc.
38Hazan regards this meeting as a "special committee responsible for
propaganda policy" and implies that after the decisions of the meetings of
this committee are approved, "directives are conveyed to the agencies direct-
ing the propaganda activities". However, according to the available evidence,3 9
this committee is an advisory and not a decision making body. The Party
heads come to these meetings after they have decided on matters of policy and
treatment beforehand. At these meetings they explain these policies to the
media chiefs, provide them with special information, convey instructions on
particular issues and answer questions. According to some sources, such
meetings are sometimes attended also by one or more members of the Politburo
concerned with a particular item on the agenda. The media representatives
raise questions and make proposals; this is how additional ways and means
for treating certain issues are hammered out at these meetings. They also
serve as a channel for attracting the attention of the Party leaders to
certain matters, since the participating Party officials may bring them up
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to the highest Party bodies.
L. Vladimirov,40 a Soviet journalist and head of the department
of a major Soviet periodical who took refuge in the West in 1966 described
the "instructional conference" as having several major functions. The
Party officials attending it pass out advance information about "laws,
decisions, appointments and decrees to be passed in the next weeks or
months". The attending editors "need this information in advance, to be
able to prepare public opinion". The officials also discuss in detail
'general political questions" including the treatment to be given to current
and forthcoming events, the coverage of planned campaigns, etc. One part
of the conference "is concerned with the various shortcomings and mistakes
that have appeared in certain papers and magazines during the previous
fortnight... editors concerned are reprimanded on the spot" or told that
"conclusions will be drawn later". According to Vladimirov it might happen
that "editors have suffered heart attacks" following these conferences.
Upon return to their offices from the conference each editor is obliged
to pass the relevant information and instructions to the department heads
and responsible officials of his publication. Again the latter pass the
necessary information down the line, keeping other parts of information not
intended for lower officials to themselves. The evidence available shows
that all these instructions are passed orally along the line; those in-
structed are allowed to take notes, but extensive and explicitly written
instructions on "delicate" matters are rare. Summaries of notes written by
those attending the instructional conference are regarded as restricted (per-
sonal) material, not available to unauthorized readers.
Meetings similar to those at the Central Committee in Moscow are
held at all lower levels -- from the Central Committees of the Republics to
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the area, city, and borough. Secondary systems of supervision and campaign
management in media are operated through the institutions of the Union of
Soviet Journalists at all levels and through such publications as Pravda
and Zhurnalist which publish reviews of the media and evaluation of their
performance. 4 1
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V. Censorship -- Glavlit and Others
The Soviet regime operates a widely ramified system of measures
to prevent unwanted information and content from reaching the Soviet citizen.
The major internal instrument for this purpose is the censorship agency,
usually referred to by the abbreviation Glavlit, which stands for the Chief
Administration for the Prevention of Publishing State Secrets. Censorship
existed in Russia as far back as 1676. It was briefly abolished after the
February revolution of 1917. Soon after the October Revolution the
Bolsheviks undertook measures against media in the hands of other parties;
they re-established censorship early in the 1920's. The history and laws
of Glavlit are fairly well described by Hopkins, Hollander, Vladimirov and
the Dewhirst collection,42 and there is no need to dwell on it here in
detail. However, some matters related to this topic warrant further elabor-
ation.
Contrary to the picture usually accepted in the West, Glavlit is
only one of many censorship services in the USSR. It pertains only to print
media, and even with regard to these it is not the only one. All printed
material passes the military censorship and is scrutinized for ideological
mistakes by the appropriate Party bodies. This accounts for the phenomenon
when publications which pass the censor are subsequently withdrawn from cir-
culation because of an adverse opinion of the ideological Party bodies.
The Glavlit apparatus is an anonymous organization whose laws, rules and
even whereabouts are not to be known to the population. The identity of
the censors, their names, background, and positions are regarded as state
secrets. It is strictly forbidden for authors to come directly in touch
with the censorship organization. They have to submit their materials
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(articles, manuscripts, monographs, works of art) to the appropriate
editorial boards and publishing houses. The editors of these are responsible
for reviewing the materials, operating as a "preliminary censorship".
Being Party appointed, trained, and controlled, these editors reject any
material which is contrary to Party line or unacceptable to the censors.
They suggest deletions, rewriting and additions so as to assure a positive
response by the censorship. Should the material be "anti-Soviet", the
editors are duty bound to report the matter to the security authorities and
to the Party. Failure to do that may be regarded as a serious breach of
discipline and may have grave consequences for the responsible person
concerned.
Only such material which has passed the responsible editors of the
newspapers and publishing houses is submitted to the censorship. There is
no way for an author to submit his material directly to the censor. The
censor takes his time and may consider the submitted material for many
months. Only very influential editors are in the position to intervene
with Party authorities on matters submitted to censorship or rejected by it.
This was the case with Solzhenitzyn's One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich
about which a controversy developed among the members of the Politburo itself.
It was finally published by a personal decision of Khruschev, then the
First Secretary of the Party.44
The censor returns material with his rulings and remarks to the
appropriate editors. They may accept the verdict of the censor totally,
or ask for explanations, and even challenge some of the censors' decisions.
In such cases the editor meets with a censorship official to hammer out
the differences and work out a final text. Formally, the corrected text is
then returned by the editor to the author, who is obliged to make the necessary
changes, additions and deletions. The author may demand explanations and
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argue with the editors, but as a rule he is not allowed to bring his objections
up to the censor himself. Moreover, often the editor will suggest the
changes to the author as if they were his own, refraining from mentioning
that these were made on demand of the censorship. Also, the censors are
not obliged in any way to give the editors or authors any explanation as
to the reasons for the changes they demanded or for rejecting the materials.
Neither has the author recourse to appeal his case to a higher authority.
According to recent emigres, such procedures are strictly adhered
to in such places as Moscow, Leningrad or Kiev where Party discipline is
strict and behaviour is bureaucratic and formalized. In smaller places in
the peripheral republics the situation is very much different.
A former editor in a state publishing house of one of the Islamic
republics explained that in their city the offices of most publishing houses
and of the censorship were placed in the same building. Since the number of
the officials was small and "everybody knew everybody", the identity of the
censors was well known. The editors and directors of publications were
intimately connected with responsible Party secretaries, the local official
Soviets and censors. The state publishing house submitted its yearly plan
outlining as required the main subjects to be treated and listing the books
to be published during the next year. But when the plan was returned by
the Party and Soviet authorities it often was so different from the original
that the editors could hardly recognize it. Themes and books which were
included in the original plan were deleted or changed out of recognition and
many new themes and publications were included, about which nobody at the
publishing house knew anything.
Personal favours were often made all along the line. The editor-
in-chief promised the translator of a book (which he had authored) to
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publish the latter's writings, which he did, despite the vehement objections
of the literary editor and other officials who thought the book to be worthless.
A top Party official ordered the publication of a research work of his
cousin though it was rejected several times as objectionable. An historical
novel was submitted which portrayed leading personalities of the local
nationality in a glowing light and those of a neighboring Soviet nationality
in utterly negative colors. It was published despite objections from
officials and editors because of personal ties between the author and a
top official of the local nationality. It was subsequently withdrawn because
of massive criticism by higher (mainly Russian) Party officials and editors.
In this intimate setting editors and censors used to meet often
to discuss submitted material. Often when the censors were challenged be-
cause of the changes they had decided to make, they would say: "You under-
stand that it is not because of my whim, but because of instructions...."
Then they would go over to the safe, unlock it, get out the volume with
instructions, and show the partinent place, and say: "You see, this is
forbidden."
The forbidden subjects relate to all matters that may disclose
"state secrets, military or economic". This is punishable under Article
75 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR by two to eight years imprisonment.
Similar articles exist in the codes of the other republics. The interpreta-
tion of this formula is rather wide ranging, as can be seen from a 1956
decree of the Government of the USSR, which included as "secrets" such
items as data on precious and rare metals, the state of currency reserves,
storage sites and stock piles of reserves.45
A recent emigre involved in sociological studies explained that
a publishing house (obviously by demand of the censorship) deleted from
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his manuscript evidence showing a very high rate of dissatisfaction among
workers with conditions of work and wages. The tables and data had to be
broken down in such a way that the reader would not be able to get compound
figures showing a negative situation. Another author reported that in his
articles he could give either full data about a certain factory without
mentioning its name and location, or give the latter data without the former.
In a time of detente, when multiple foreign delegations visit the
USSR and vice versa, and in an epoch of spy satellites, when the Americans
are capable of gaining information on any object in the USSR -- what useful
purpose can be served by this elaborate system of censorship pertaining to
every word produced by the many media in the USSR? Knowledgeable recent
emigre's faced with this question gave the following reasons:
a. The censorship system is a conservative carry-over from the
former times of almost total Stalinist secrecy; it is not as
indispensable today as in the past.
b. The all pervading blanket of secrecy still serves some pur-
poses in covering up major Soviet weaknesses as well as the
extent of Soviet concentration on military strength at the
expense of the Soviet consumer.
c. Soviet censorship is directed first and foremost toward the
Soviet citizen himself; security reasons and the "foreign
danger" are utilized as an excuse for preventing the Soviet
citizen from gaining information and acquiring concepts which
could be detrimental to the regime.
Beyond the censorship agency itself, the Party controls the media
through its factual monopoly on selection, training and appointment of all
journalists. All responsible media positions are within the so-called
nomenklatura - a list of positions which can be filled only by a decision
of Party bodies at various levels. Moreover, the usual practice is to inter-
change personnel between the media, security and government agencies, and
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the Party apparatus. E.G. Sviridov, who was Deputy Head of the Propaganda
Department of the CC CPSU, was appointed Chairman of the Committee for the
Press at the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR (September 1969). In
August 1969 M. Davtyan, former secretary of the CC of the Komsomol in
Armenia, was appointed Chairman of the Committee for Radio and TV of the
Armenian Republic.4 6
Appointments and dismissals are also used to assure personal loyalty,
since the Party leader at any level is interested in having "his own men"
at the crucial positions dealing with media. Following the fall of Khruschev
several of his men heading the various media were removed and substituted
by people loyal to the new leadership.
A former top Soviet journalist related that he had a direct contact
with a member of the Politburo (D. Polyansky) who used to read materials
which he sent him and give his opinion above the head of the normal censor-
ship officials.
Training for the media is concentrated at Party schools and major
universities under the strict supervision of the Party. The study of
Marxism-Leninism and other ideological subjects is obligatory at all such
training institutions. The great majority of working journalists in respon-
sible positions are Party or Komsomol members; at the higher levels such
membership is absolutely indispensable. Working journalists are members
of the Union of Soviet Journalists which is a Party-controlled organization.
Similarly, all working writers must necessarily be members of the USSR
Union of Writers. Writers and journalists are subject to disciplinary
measures by their respective organizations. Those who would not accept
Party rule are expelled, prevented from entering employment or publishing
anywhere in the USSR.4 7
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S. Ivanov, the Chairman of the Ukrainian Committee for Cinematog-
raphy, was harshly criticized at a session of the Secretariat of the Writers
Union of the USSR for "uncritically including decadent forms of the Western
cinema" in a film by K. Murakov produced in the Ukraine. Despite public
self-criticism by Ivanov, who admitted "his great errors", he was dismissed
several weeks later and transferred to "another, unspecified post".4 8
A former Chairman of the Local Section of the Trade Union of
Journalists in Leningrad testifies that a Party recommendation is indispen-
sable for being accepted to work at any of the important newspapers down
to the rayon level. In the major city centers there usually is a long list
of people seeking work as journalists who remain without a position for
prolonged periods of time. Some of the recent emigr'es were freelance
writers for Soviet publications; some of them were never able to secure a
position because they lacked a proper Party recommendation since they had
the "wrong" ethnic background.4 9
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VI. The Men in Charge of Communications
As mentioned aboveone of the most effective ways of Party control
of communications is the tight monopoly on training, appointments, promotions
and dismissal by the appropriate Party bodies. Only a few of those responsible
for media received professional journalist training. On the other hand
many were trained in Party schools and at ideological departments of the
Party. 5 0
The most frequent training pattern is a combination of higher Party
training with specialized higher education, and a career which includes
work both in some Party institution and in other state and public bodies. 5 1
S.G. Lapin,who took over the chairmanship of the USSR Committee for Radio
and TV in April 1970, had until then been Director General of TASS. His
previous career was mainly in the Foreign Service of the USSR. He was
educated at first at the University of Leningrad, graduated from the Higher
Party School (1942), was Vice Chairman for the Committee for Radio (1945-1955),
and Ambassador to China (1965-1967). He is a member of the Central Committee
since 1966. M.V. Zimyanin, editor of Pravda since 1965, is also Chairman
of the Soviet Journalist Union and a member of the Party Central Committee
(both since 1966). He was originally educated at Teachers Institute and
made his career in the Komsomol and in the Party in Belorussia. In 1960-1965
he served as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia.
The heads of the sections in the Central Committee Secretariat who
deal with media are mainly people who have done their career within the
Party Apparat. D.P. Shveglin, Head of the Information Department since
1965, is a lawyer and journalist by profession who was educated at the
Moscow Law Institute and the Higher Party School. He worked in the field
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of education and Party affairs in Belorussia and later moved to Moscow where
he is a Central Committee member. A.G. Yegorov, the editor of the Party
ideological monthly Kommunist, was appointed to this position after a
continuous Party career during which he served subsequently as Head of the
CC Departments for Ideology and for Propaganda. The education and career
of K.S. Simonov, Head of the Department of Transportation and Communication
at the Central Committee is perhaps typical of other Party heads in charge
of a specific technological branch. He received a technical. education and
had a prolonged career in railway and transportation management, before
being transferred to Party jobs in his specialization.
One would normally assume that the security services have people of
their own among the top communications people. However there is evidence
of several of them having connections with the KGB. This is the case,
for example, with N.N. Mesyatsev, who was Chairman of the Committee for
Radio and TV in the years 1968-70. He began his career at the Military
Legal Academy in 1938 (the year of the Great Purge), which was training
military judges and interrogators. (The famous "troika" secret tribunals
were usually staffed by officers of the security forces with some legal
training.) Upon graduation he worked as interrogator, subsequently moving
into a Party career. He graduated from the Academy of Social Sciences in
1955 and went into the Department of Propaganda of the CC.
A typical career of the type "from worker and student to top Party
boss", is that of the former Head of the CC Department of Propaganda, V.I.
Stepakov. Born in 1912, he was sent as a worker activist to study at a
Communist University. He graduated from Moscow Teachers Institute in 1952,
was Department Deputy Head at the Moscow Board of the Ministry of State
Security (1952-1953, the last years of Stalin), again went to study at the
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Academy of Social Sciences and graduated in 1957. Then, after several Party
jobs and one year as editor of Izvestia, he was appointed Head of the Propa-
ganda Department and became a member of the CC.
The background of the Chairman of the Board of Znanie Society is
very different from those heading the other media institutions. Being a
voluntary organization of the Soviet Intelligentsia, it is headed by
Academician I.I. Artobolevsky. Graduated in 1926 from the Agricultural
Academy in Moscow, he later became a specialist in machine building. He
holds three orders of Lenin and is a Hero of Labour. Available evidence
does not point to any Party or security career in his background. However,
according to evidence of emigres, when this is the case the Party and security
connections are assumed by Deputy Heads who have the proper training and
personal record.
By a decree of the Supreme Soviet the heads of TASS editorial offices
and top officials of this organization are subject to a special procedure
in case of labour disputes. These are decided by higher authorities and not
by the Trade Unions or in court. This is one of the many special arrangements,
both in terms of privileges and control, which are typical for media personnel
in the USSR.5 2
Emigres formerly employed by influential Soviet media testify that
an editor or even an ordinary correspondent from a central newspaper gets
top VIP treatment when travelling for his paper in the provinces or visiting
an enterprise or an institution in his own area. Vladimirov, who arrived
in Alma-Ata on behalf of the Moscow journal Nauka i Zhizn, was housed in
the Party Central Committee hostel which is the most luxurious in the republic
and populated by select top officials and personalities.53 A correspondent
of the Literaturnaya Gazeta on a visit to the industrial city of Perm was
given the same treatment. A film maker from Moscow on a visit to the
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northern port of Murmansk was taken without a passport or legal permission
on a voyage of several days to the shores of Norway, during which he gave
his word to the captain that he would not leave the boat. The captain
obviously undertook a considerable risk. According to the informant, he
did this to curry favor with the influential media man, since contact with
him may always turn out to be of some use.
Despite the tight controls on manpower in communications, the
authorities are not able to prevent some "unwanted people" from doing some
work in the field. Sometimes these are officially approved people, e.g.,
the people in charge of the KVN program (an innovative student program which
included spontaneous thought and reactions of young people to various
problems) were dismissed several times over when the Party supervisers
felt that the program was getting out of control. In the northern town of
Norilsk a group of young professionals formed a special team named Kontur
for producing lively and interesting programs for young people. After
three months work the team was ordered to disband and join other production
teams. However, the latter refused to accept its members. The reasons
were given as follows:
1. The group failed to maintain close touch with the local Komsomol,
2. The team advocated the introduction in Norilsk of the Shchekino
experiment (an economic reform measure which provided for saving
in manpower and dividing the saved fund between the working
personnel), without previously consulting the local Party
members and,
3. The media men in the other teams resented the members of Kontur
because of their professional efficiency and education.5 4
Apart from professional full time journalists, there are numerous
part time and freelance writers who work for the media sporadically.
According to emigrE evidence, many of these are quite different from the
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full time journalists. They are non-Party and often anti-establishment
people, bright and energetic, or quite Bohemian, who would rather earn
a quick ruble by writing a piece or two a month for some publication than
slave it out as full time employees under rigorous control. Some of these
use the assignments from an influential publication as a strategem for
posing as fully accredited representatives and for investigating real life.
Despite the strict self censorship which the part time writers impose on
themselves in order to get published, their materials are often refused
by the responsible editors because they are not in accord with the official
line, or are too revealing of unfavorable social realities. One such part
time writer who described in realistic terms the outmoded and authoritarian
behaviour of teachers in a school in suburban Moscow and reported the
demands of the pupils for reform had his articles returned by the editor
of an influential youth journal with a comment: "This is anti-Soviet
material".
The Soviet authorities have major problems with some mass activities
of young people which are very difficult to control. During the last
several years private film making, shortwave broadcasting and tape recording
have become rather popular hobbies. In order to control the field and to
utilize the talent, the authorities make efforts to develop formal institutions
for these activities. At the Mosfilm central studios in Moscow, a major
department for amateur film making was created. Some of the foremost film-
people in the USSR became interested in it, and are investing much of their
time in this department. According to evidence, private film making and
film shows are nevertheless widespread without official controls.
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A serious problem is created by the so-called "radio hooligans" --
youngsters who use their amateur shortwave transmitters for informal chatter
and conmunication. The Soviet press complains that such private broadcasting
pollutes the air, and "causes interference with public broadcasting". More-
over, the radio hams often use their communication facility for broadcasting
officially unapproved information and opinions as well as for content which
is officially regarded as obscene. The Soviet authorities are taking
stringent measures to curb this dangerous phenomenon. Since it is difficult
to locate all the trespassers, a major public campaign is waged in the
media to enroll the cooperation of the public against them. In the opinion
of emigres the authorities utilize the obscene remarks of some of the radio
hams in order to suppress the many others who are "clean" and whose broadcasts
are objectionable to them for political reasons.55
In 1975 some 100,000 journalists were working in all "media and
propaganda agencies" of the USSR. Some 15,000 students were studying in
journalist-training institutions (at day, evening, and correspondence
departments), whichincluded 21 universities, 12 Higher Party Schools, and
the Academy of Social Sciences at the Party CC. About 70% of the members
of the Union of Soviet Journalists had at least some years of college and
1400 had titles of Candidate or Doctor of Science.
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B. THE MEDIA
I. Government Bodies In Charge Of Communications
It was pointed out above that the government is not the sole owner
and operator of media in the USSR. Nevertheless, it does directly run and
supervise the great bulk of the media in that country. For this purpose
it set up several major organizations on a functional basis. There is,
however, no single body which coordinates, plans and supervises all govern-
ment media. Following are the major government bodies dealing with media:
1. The Ministry of Communications, which operates most of the
technical communications facilities, as well as the network
of the official mail and telegraph services.
2. The USSR Government Committee for Radio and Television.
3. The Union-Republican State Committee for Cinematography (Goskino).
4. The USSR Government Committee for Publishing, Printing and the
Booktrade (Goskomizdat).
5. The independent censorship agency (Glavlit).
6. The Ministry of Culture.
7. The USSR State Planning Board (Gosplan).
Many other government ministries are concerned with media, though
this is not their main field of activities. The Ministry of Defense operates
publishing houses, newspapers, radio and oral communications networks for
its purposes. The Ministry of Education as well as all other ministries
concerned with education and training of manpower are dealing with publica-
tions of textbooks and of aids in education. They publish newspapers, books,
and journals and operate communication networks for their particular purposes.
Amongst such government agencies are the Committee for State Security, the
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Ministry of Fisheries, the Central Statistical Board, and so on.2
Parallel to these bodies established at the USSR (federal) level
in Moscow, similar agencies exist at the various levels of the Soviet admin-
istrative system: republic, oblast, province, rayon (district or county).
At a rayon level there is a propaganda section at the local Party headquarters
with an official in charge, subject to one of the Party secretaries and to
the First Secretary who is the top official. At the local Soviet Executive
Committee, which is both a local authority and a branch of the central government
apparatus, there are local equivalents of the central bodies. Programs on
local issues in electronic media are prepared and controlled by the local rep-
resentatives of the Committee for Radio and Television. A local branch of the
Ministry of Culture (raiono, gorono) is in charge of the educational network,
and so on.
The distribution of newspapers and periodicals all over the USSR is
in the hands of a special government agency Soyuzpechat (Union-press), which
is under the Ministry of Communications. The great majority of newspapers and
periodicals are distributed by subscription and delivered by the Government
Post Office. The rest is sold by Soyuzpechat in its ships and kiosks all over
the country. Publishing and printing is done by many organizations both govern-
mental and non-governmental.3 However, overall supervision and management is
entrusted to the Committee for Publishing, Printing and the Booktrade. The
Committee also runs the sales of books in the country throughout a network of
facilities of its own (Soyuzkniga).
Until 1972 the press all over the USSR was controlled by the Committee
for the Press at the USSR Council of Ministers. In August 1972 it was trans-
formed into the UNION-Republican State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers
for Publishing, Printing and the Booktrade, with B.I. Stukalin as Chairman.4
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II. Soviet Radio
As mentioned above,5 Soviet radio developed especially since the
death of Stalin. Following the XX Party Congress in 1956, medium and long
wave broadcasting was widely introduced in the European USSR and short
wave broadcasting in the Far East and Central Asia. In the beginning of
1960 the CC of the Party sharply criticized the work of the Soviet broad-
casting network. It obliged it, within a short time, to provide the Soviet
listeners all over the USSR with a choice of several programs. It demanded
that the broadcasters diversify the programs by introducing more interesting
broadcasts and interviews through drawing on some of the best talent
available.
The CC took the matter up again in 1967 in a decision which especially
stressed the shortcomings in broadcasting in the rural areas. It demanded
that in each republic and oblast firm dates be fixed for the completion of
the wired-loudspeakers network. The CC stressed the need in introducing the
loudspeakers with a three-program capacity, so that listeners would be
able to chose between a) the Central (Moscow) program, b) the Mayak light
program, and c) the local (republic, province, district) program. The
Ministry of Radioproducts was instructed to arrange for the production of
such loudspeakers. The Ministry of Trade was obliged to provide for the
sale of these to the public on a subscription basis so that loudspeakers
with three programs would be installed in all apartment houses, hotels,
hospitals, and other public buildings. To ensure better work and servicing,
all radio stations, transmitters and radio cables were transferred to the Min-
istry of Communications. (Previously some were in the hands of many small
local agencies. 6) The loudspeaker is the poor man's radio; it is widespread
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in the houses of the rural dwellers, the rooms of the ordinary workers, and
in the dormitories of students and trainees. These people are not able to
listen to the more popular and lively Mayak program at all, and during much
of the broadcasting time they are actually condemned to one program only
since the other is in a language which they do not understand.
At a conference at the Central Committee Propaganda Department in
Moscow in the summer of 1968 the central topic was the work of the news
services. Considerable improvements were noted, but the news bulletins of the
Mayak station as well as the Vostok (which broadcasts to the eastern areas
of the USSR) were said to be not sufficiently operative.
At another ccnference, which this department arranged together with
the Agricultural Department of the CC, it was noted that programs for rural
listeners are often broadcast at times inconvenient for people in agricul-
ture. The broadcasters often do not know village life and make clumsy
mistakes. The connection between rural editorial boards and the Ministeries
and agencies concerned is often rather weak.7
The total broadcasting output of the USSR, including broadcasts
abroadwas about 1500 hours per day. Internal broadcasting was in 70
languages for an audience of some 200 million people. In an official report
Soviet radio and television were presented as a major industry, a branch of
culture with 500 organizations and almost 50,000 employees. The 1970-1975
Five Year Plan envisaged such a development of broadcasting that it would
ensure the simultaneous reception of at least two programs all over the
country. For this purpose new major stations are being built especially
in the Far East, Central Asia and Kazakhstan.8
Soviet broadcasting abroad was conducted in 57 languages, mostly by
the station Peace and Progress which is directed to the developing countries.
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Ultra-shortwave broadcasting is to be introduced for two and four
program transmissions. For this purpose special stations capable of serving
both radio and television are to be built.
At present the central studios in Moscow operate four major programs.9
The first is the main program carrying the bulletins, major news and commen-
taries, documentaries, and entertainment. It operates from 5 o'clock in the
morning until 2 o'clock at night. The second program goes on from 6 o'clock
in the morning until 1 o'clock after midnight.
The third program is mainly devoted to shows and literary broadcasting.
The Soviet practice is not to put on special shows for radio or television,
but rather to televise the best theatrical and light entertainment perfor-
mances (operas, dramas, concerts, shows) as they appear on the Soviet stage.
This station operates from 5 o'clock in the afternoon until the end of the
particular show broadcasted on that particular evening.
The fourth program is on the air all hours of the day and night.
This is the so-called Mayak program, which is perhaps closest to the Western-
type radio service. Inaugurated in September 1964, it has become very
popular because of its informal, lively presentation and its young voices.
Its style is in total contrast to the old type declamatory and pathos-
ridden style of traditional Soviet broadcasting. It has short news releases
every half an hour and is filled with lively interesting programs.
Local radio broadcasting is conducted by some 2800 town and district
editorial boards. Major facilities in some of the big cities are in an
intermediary position. For example, the station in Leningrad which employs
2400 people, broadcasts for the whole country about two hours per day.
Stations in the faraway lands (e.g., Far East) broadcast many hours since
the Central Program in Moscow cannot be received there, especially during the
local peak hours.
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The Central Broadcasting Agency is subordinate to the Committee for
Radio and Television which was created as an independent agency in April
1962 by a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. The Committee is
headed by a Chairman and an Editorial Collegium of 13 members. The
Committee is responsible for all broadcasting content and operates the
studios and the necessary internal equipment. However, the broadcasting
stations, studio buildings, transmitting equipment, and the cable lines are
owned and operated by the Ministry of Communications. The Central Broad-
casting Agency is subdivided into a number of main editorial boards such as
Propaganda, Musical Broadcasts, Literary Programs, Information, Youth
Programs, and Broadcasting for Children. The special programs such as
Mayak and Yunost (youth) are also operated by the Central Broadcasting
Agency. However, as Yunost is too political and propagandistic, the young
appear to prefer the Mayak programs.10 For the Soviet fleet abroad, which
has expanded greatly in the last decade and whose personnel is especially
exposed to foreign stations, Moscow operates special programs such as
"Dlya tekh kto v more."
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III. Soviet Television
Soviet writers ascribe some of the major inventions in the field of
television to Russian and Soviet scientists. They date the beginning of
television broadcasting in the USSR to the early thirties. Yet television
broadcasting was introduced only since the middle fifties, when programs
were broadcasted every day without interruption (1955, with a second program
introduced in 1956). The first entertainment programs were inaugurated in
1956 such as "Evening of Merry Questions," which was later substituted by
the very popular "Club of the Mertyand Smart." This program is a game of
intelligence and inventiveness, which is broadcast each time from another
city, mostly with students as participants. At the end of the fifties the
newscast programs were thoroughly reorganized: existing interesting and
operative programs were more frequent and more such programs were introduced.
In 1967 color television broadcasting was introduced, after the USSR had
concluded an agreement with France acquiring the patents of the French
color system.
In the early sixties the Party CC addressed itself to the problems
of television broadcasting twice (in 1960 and 1962). In both cases it
stressed the great potential of this medium in propagating the policies
of the Party and in molding the Soviet man. The decisions demonstrated the
interest of the Party leadership in TV and helped mobilize support for its
development. 11
By 1970 Soviet TV was transmitted by 1466 stations, including 132
"program initiating stations". The network ensures reception for about 175
million people, 70% of the country's population (1974). For transmission
to a great distance the USSR operates communication satellites, "Molniya,"
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and a network of 36 stations, "Orbita". In this way some 30 million in
the distant territories of the USSR can receive the programs of Central
(Moscow) Television. Toward the end of the sixties several major broad-
casting stations and studios were completed. The greatest of these, and
apparently the largest in Europe, is the 537 meters high station in
Ostankina in Moscow. It can accommodate four thousand people simultaneously
and has major film-making studios. Other major facilities are stationed in
Leningrad and in the Vitebsk area (with stations 316 and 350 meters high
respectively). The studios and their equipment belong to the Committee for
TV and Radio, but the transmission towers and lines are in the hands of
the Ministry of Communications.
The 1971-1975 Five Year Plan foresaw further development of TV:
60 major stations serving the "Orbita" system, at least one color program
in the capitals of the republics, as well as the transmission of "other
types of information including newspaper pages." Such pages are being
transmitted by TV so that Central newspapers are printed simultaneously
in twenty major cities, apart from Moscow.1 2
Moscow TV now has four programs which are on the air most of the
morning and afternoon, and all hours of the evening until close to midnight.
However, from nine in the morning until six in the afternoon only the first
program is available with an interruption during midday when no television
is on the air at all. In the evening four programs are operating simultan-
eously. Two of these are devoted almost entirely to official propaganda
and scientific broadcasts. Though some of the films are in color, there
is not one program in the USSR which is fully in color. According to tes-
timony by recent 6migrds, color television did not become widespread because
of the low quality of the color picture, the scarcity of good color programs,
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and the high price of color sets, amounting to about a half-year average
income. The Soviet Union is linked to the Intervision System in which 11
countries of Eastern Europe participate. It also exchanges programs with
Eurovision. However, even a republican capital like Kishinev has difficulty
in receiving Intervision programs, because of outdated equipment. In 1974
305 cities received the programs of Moscow (Central) TV; of those, 103
cities received color programs.13
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IV. Postal and Telephone Services
Postal services in the USSR are rather slow and inefficient. The
pay of postal personnel is relatively low, many of them are elderly and
female, they rarely have the necessary transportation facilities. Delays
are especially frequent during bad weather when only some major modern
roads are passable. As a result large areas of the countryside and even
parts of major cities are cut-off. The Soviet postman carries a heavy bag,
since he is also a distribution agent for all printed matter. This is why
the daily paper often reaches the Soviet home sometime between late morning
and the early afternoon; when there is bad weather or some delay, a Soviet
citizen may receive his latest newspaper several days later. Additional
complications are created by censorship of letters and postal material in
general (especially foreign correspondence), as well as the vastness of the
country, multiplicity of languages and alphabets, and outmoded equipment. 1 4
To beat the slowness and unreliability of the General Post Office,
as well as to guard professional and political security secrets, the various
Soviet hierarchies developed transmittal systems of their own composed of
special telephone lines, tele-printers, special package delivery arrangements
(by air) and courier networks. According to 'emigr6 evidence, important
Party and Government dispatches, as well as restricted circulars and statis-
tical materials, are transmitted by special couriers who carry these materials
in locked dispatch cases. They hand these in person to the addressees and get
their signature as evidence for delivery. Each document has a separate
number; the recipient is obliged to keep the material in a locked place
and not to make it available to anyone else.
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The ordinary citizen and firm can overcome the slowness of the postal
service by using cable services which are relatively cheap and more efficient.
Cables are especially widely used because of the inefficient development
of the Soviet telephone system and because receiving a telegram is still
traditionally regarded as a matter of prestige. For these reasons Soviet
citizens send telegrams to each other on various occasions much like people
in the West send greeting cards (e.g., New Year, major festivals, and death).1 5
The telephone services are amongst the most underdeveloped and
inefficient elements within the Soviet communications system. The Soviet
authorities accorded relatively high priority to investing in mass media which
serve the purposes of socialization in the official ideology. But they
apparently saw no great merit in devoting major resources to the development
of the mass telephone network for the convenient communication between
private citizens. The telephone network was therefore at first developed
almost exclusively for the needs of the regime -- for communication between
the official bureaucracies and their members. However, for reasons of
secrecy, telephone books were totally unavailable from the mid-thirties
until several years after the death of Stalin. They are still a rarity
even in such major centers as Moscow and Leningrad. Printed once in many
years in limited editions, they are often outdated at the time of publica-
tion. Telephone subscribers in Tashkent, the major city of Soviet Central
Asia, had to wait seven years for the publication of a new telephone book.
The book carried a notification that because of many changes and errors a
correction supplement would be issued shortly after publication. Reports in
Soviet newspapers indicate that there are still entire villages, settlements,
housing estates, and even town districts with only a single telephone or
without a telephone whatsoever.
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Since the early sixties the Soviets have undertaken efforts to
modernize and widely expand their telephone system. Early in 1972 it was
reported that all rayon centers in Moldavia had semi-automatic telephone
exchanges with Kishinev, and the system was being extended to direct dialing
between major towns. In 1971, 7500 more flats were equipped with telephones
in the city of Kishinev.16 The wider aspects of the development of the
telephone services during the post-Stalin period were reviewed above (Part A,
Section I).
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V. The Media Owned by the Party and by Public Organizations
Though officially a public organization, the CPSU is indeed the
uppermost part of the Soviet political system, and the locus of the ultimate
power in the USSR. As such, the Party operates a system of mass media of
its own. However, this does not relate to electronic media which are fully
owned by the state.
First and foremost amongst the Party publications are the following
newspapers: Pravda (9 million copies in 1972), which is the main daily in
the USSR; Komsomolskaya Pravda, for the young communists (8.4 million); and
Pionierskaya Pravda, for school children (9.8 million). These three Party
papers alone amount to some 28 million copies per day; and they are only
a minor part in the publications empire of the Party. The bi-weekly
Partiinaya Zhizn (Party Life), has a printing of a million copies. The
theoretical journal Kommunist has a circulation of 750,000. Pravda operates
also a publishing house, which issues many other publications.
The Party issues many newspapers for the specific areas or pro-
fessional fields, e.g., Sovetskaya Rossiya (Soviet Russia), which is the
main paper for the RSFSR, Selskaya Zhizn (Village Life),the chief newspaper
for the village population, Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya (Socialist
Industry), a paper for the problems of industrial enterprises, and so on.17
Media which belong to public organizations are naturally staffed by
people appointed by these organizations. However, the responsible officials
amongst them are those who gain approval from the appropriate Party and
security bodies. Some of these, however, were prominent people in their
own right before their appointment and have close connections with the
Central Committee. Such people are able to play an independent role of
their own. As indicated above, public organizations are major owners and
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operators of media in the USSR. Following are some data about these
organizations and their activities.
The USSR Union of Journalists is the recognized professional organi-
zation for journalists in print media, radio and television. Founded in
1959 it counted some 52,000 members at the end of 1972, of whom about 80%
were Party members. Like many other such unions it is managed by an elected
(Party approved) board and its chairman (M.V. Zimyanin). The organization
publishes the monthly Zhurnalist. It also publishes the weekly Za Rubezhom
in partnership with Pravda. The weekly contains a digest of the world
press, selected in accord with official Soviet policies, and reviews on
international affairs. Since it provides a window into the world, additional
to whatever is published elsewhere in the Soviet press, it is popular with
the intellectual reader interested in world affairs and prints about
1,000,000 copies. 1 8
The Soviet trade unions own publishing houses (Profizdat) which
published 28,000,000 copies of books in 1972. A network of Trade Union
Houses contains public libraries (285 million volumes in 1972), operates
theater and art activities, arranges for cinema performances and so forth.
Mass adult education in the Party spirit is the domain of the Organization
of the Soviet Intelligentsia, called Znanie (Knowledge). Established in
1947, it was managed by a board headed by the well known academician I.I.
Artobolevsky. The society holds lecture series, seminars, adult education
classes, public lectures and symposia all over the Soviet Union and is in
fact the major agency outside the Party for oral instruction for the
intelligent public. Its publishing houses of the same name -- with branches
in many of the republics -- prints some 40 million copies of its books (1972).
It publishes a series of popular science journals such as Nauka i Zhizn
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(Science and Life) and distributed 3.2 million copies in 1972, as well
as a journal devoted to international affairs called Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn
published in Russian, English and French simultaneously.19
A similar situation pertains to other public organizations. The
Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign
Countries, publishes the newspaper Moscow News available also in French,
Spanish and Arabic, and journals such as Kultura i Zhizn issued simultaneously
in Russian, English, French, German and Spanish. The Dossaf Organization
(The All Union Voluntary Society for Assisting the Army, Air Force and Navy),
a patriotic organization of civilians for promoting the knowledge of
military affairs and for para-military training, issues journals such as
Sovetskii Patriot, Radio, Voyennye znaniya (Military Knowledge). A one-
time printing of its publications amounts to 2.5 million copies.20
A full scale review of such organizations in the USSR and of their
media operations is not the purpose of this paper. The examples given above
may be sufficient, however, to illustrate the basic point about media
operations by public organizations in the USSR. They do it under the multiple
control of the Party and in accord with the Party spirit (partiinost). Yet
it is quite natural that the media units operated by a specific organization
reflect some of the specific interests of its parent body, which sometimes
may be at some variance with those of the Government and Party as a whole.
Unique amongst publications in the USSR are those published by
"ideologically alien" bodies. Even a system like that of the USSR finds
it impossible to totally prevent such publications. Amongst these are,
for example, the official organ of the Russian Orthodox Church, Zhurnal
Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, published monthly since 1943 (also in 1932-35), or
the Baptiskii Vestnik (Baptist Herald), published by the Union of Baptists
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in the USSR. Other examples are journals published in other countries in
Russian according to a reciprocal arrangement between governments, e.g.,
Amerika or Anglia.2 1
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VI. The Book Trade
During the first years after the Revolution the Soviet authorities
practiced a free distribution of books and pamphlets. During the NEP period
a limited amount of private publishing was allowed. Since then it is almost
totally in the hands of the Government and public agencies. A semblance of
small-scale semi-private book selling is carried on by the special shops for
antique books and bazaar stalls. Though formally owned by some public
organization, they are usually run by persons specializing in the field
(sometimes as if they owned them).
Since the Soviet economy is largely run as a planned command economy
and book publishing is managed by centrally directed and politically
motivated bodies, priorities in publishing and distribution are set according
to political rather than trade criteria. However, from time to time, the
Party authorities respond to massive complaints and disproportions in the
field of publishing by insisting that the book trade should take into
account the demands and needs of the population. This was the essence of
a decree issued by the CC on August 15, 1931.22
In 1935 the book trade was first put under the Ministry of Culture
and then transferred to the jurisdiction of the Committee for the Press of
the USSR government. With the creation of the Goskomizdat in 1972 it
moved to the jurisdiction of this committee. The major book sale organizations
are: Soyuzkniga (Union-Book), which was an independent organization at first
and was put under Goskomizdat in 1973. The sale of books in the countryside
is conducted by a branch of the co-op shops called Tsentrokoopkniga (Center
Co-op-Book).
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Books are sold in the book shops and kiosks belonging to the Ministry
of Communications (Soyuzpechat). Some publishing houses (Nauka, Transport)
have retail shops of their own. International book trade is conducted by a
special organization called Mezhdunarodnaya Knisa (International Book). It
is a share holder company owned by several Soviet organizations, and promotes
and sells Soviet books abroad and is an authorized importer of foreign
books to the USSR.
The economic reform in the USSR combined with some pressure from
consumers and the authorities brought some substantial changes in Soviet
publication practices. The traditional practice was for the central
authorities and publishing houses to fix the printing (circulation) quotas
for the various publications. The result was that some propaganda material
of unpopular books which for some reason caught the central bureaucrats'
fancy were issued in large printings and gathered dust on the shelves of
the bookshops. At the same time many publications were printed in small
numbers, sold out on the day of issue and then resold in the black market
at high prices. Presently, the procedures provide that the major bookshop
organizations place orders on books before publication and that these
be taken into account for the purpose of fixing the number of copies
printed. However, according to evidence from visitors and recent emigres
things have changed only to a degree.
Book printing and the book trade still run very much on political
and bureaucratic lines. Bookshops are usually packed with unpopular propa-
gandistic materials, whereas those of the greatest interest for the buyers
are not available. Some very popular books by Soviet and Russian writers
who were previously forbidden are printed in limited editions despite a
tremendous demand for them. As a result a black and grey book market developed:
book sellers sell such editions "under the counter." 2 3
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A typical problem is raised by an engineer from the town of Aralsk,
in Kazakhstan. The firm for which she works orders technical books through
the two local bookshops. But out of hundreds of items ordered only several
were actually received, due to mismanagement and lack of interest of the
local book sellers and the central organizations. The catalogues of the
major publishing houses are extremely scarce and direct ordering of the books
is difficult. In an answer to this complaint the deputy chairman of the
State Committee for Publishing, G. Martirosyan, admitted that larger
printings of the catalogue might be of help and that direct ordering of
books by readers and organizations should be honoured much like subscrip-
tions to newspapers and journals. He put much of the blame on the lack
of well trained "book specialists.' The Soviet secondary and higher educa-
tional institutions in which such specialists are trained had not yet
trained the latter in sufficient numbers. 2 4
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VII. Financial Aspects of Media Operations
In the ninth Five Year Plan (1971-1975) 4.63 billion rubles were
earmarked for investment into the communications network (excluding print
media). This sum is 36.3% higher than in the previous five year period.
It amounts to more than 1% of the total investment during 1971-1975 (432.2
billion). A comparison between government investment and the total invest-
ment in the entire economy shows that the non-governmental portion is rather
small,amounting to only 15% of the total. The available evidence indicates
that such investment exists in many forms: public organizations, the Party
bodies, as well as economic enterprises earmark certain amounts from their
budgets (and portions of profit from media operated by them) for the further
development of mass media which they own. For example, the kolkhozy invest
some money into the development of a loudspeaker broadcasting system or
for acquiring equipment for a small local news-sheet. Pravda may invest some
of its profits into acquiring more modern printing equipment for some of its
printing plants. A firm may earmark some money from the extra funds for
building a cinema at its housing estate.
It is not known, however, whether the figures for the Five Year Plan
include estimates for the investment of non-governmental organizations or
reflect government investment only. According to 6migres who worked in
mass media owned by public organizations, the latter received planning
instructions from governmental planning bodies. The organizations submit a
yearly and five-yearly plan of their own and are obligated to fulfill their
plans much like government organizations. Soviet overall plans for economic
development and housing include planned estimates for the non-governmental
sectors (kolkhoz and co-operative).2 5
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Due to continuous paper shortages in the USSR, inexpensive printed
materials are bought by the population and are used as paper for many purposes.
(This writer used to buy old music sheets and used them as notebooks.) The
circulation of certain printed material is also boosted as a result of the
official pressures and by the prevailing cultural fashions. Certain categories
of officials and active members of public organizations are expected to
subscribe to the publications related to their occupation and/or organization.26
All trade union officials and activists are induced to subscribe to Trud,
the trade union newspaper. All offices, agencies, institutions of a certain
Ministry put on their desks and bookselves books published by that particular
Ministry and those recommended by the Party. During the long Lenin celebra-
tions in 1969-1970 many millions of books on and about Lenin were sold.
Young couples and Soviet professional people have libraries or bookshelves
of their own with volumes of the popular writer of the moment, e.g., Sholokhov,
Gorky, Pushkin and A. Tolstoy in Stalin's time; or Dostoevsky, Bulgakov,
and Tvardovsky at present. The phenomenon of ordering books by the yard for
decorating and fashionable purposes is also not unknown. A new apartment
and studio of a successful Soviet sculptor was furnished with a library of
new multi-volume editions for impression's sake. 27
At each Soviet enterprise there are several special funds: for
development, for social needs, and for material incentives. The fund "for
the development of the enterprise", draws from three sources: part of the
sums that are put aside for amortization expenses, part of the profit, and
part of the income from discarded properties. In 1968 the portions for
each item were 57%, 15%, and 28% respectively. About 40% of the planned
profit has to be diverted into the development funds. The payments for the
development fund are entered into special accounts at the State Bank. This
-60-
procedure had been introduced in connection with the economic reform, which
provided the enterprise with wider rights and possibilities for the renewal
of equipment and for investment. However, major modernization of equipment
or major further investment is still planned by the central authorities
and financed from central funds.
The social fund draws a certain portion of the above plan income
which the enterprise is entitled to retain for the needs of its employees.
It can be used for improving medical services, additional spending on
childrens' institutions, for workers' comfort, cultural facilities, and
housing. The administration of both funds is in the hands of the enterprise
managers who must consult on these matters with the trade union boards.
They also have the right to shift up to 20% of the amounts from one fund
to another.2 8
Income of the communication enterprises includes rent for communica-
tion channels such as telegraph, telephone, and broadcasting which is paid
by organizations using those channels on a long-term basis. The pay accrues
for the uninterrupted work of such channels; where an interruption of more
than thirty minutes occurs, there is no pay for unused time. Pay for the
work transmitters (for radio communications and for radio and television
broadcasting) is counted by the hour of actual use and depends on the strength
of each transmitter. Within the communications enterprises there is no
mutual accounting and separate pay for services. For example, the telegraph
services use radio communications and interurban telephone cables for trans-
mitting telegrams; but the latter do not present accounts to the former for
these services. An authoritative Soviet text explains that this is necessary
in order to facilitate the mutual interchangeability between means of electri-
cal communications and radio communications. Otherwise, if accounts were
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mutually presented, some enterprises would refrain from using more costly
means and the result would be slowing down the flow of messages.
Under the economic reform each enterprise has clearly earmarked
sources of income and if it overfulfills the income plan, a certain portion
of the additional income is retained by the enterprise. In 1968 the total
income of the newspaper delivery firm Soyuzpechat was 147 million RB, about
13.5% of its total turnover. The expenditure of the system amounted to
106 million RB, and the net profit was 41 million RB.
In order to further stimulate the work of communictions enterprises
the USSR government allows enterprises to develop additional services, the
income from which accrues to the enterprise itself. Such additional income
and its utilization are not entered into the official plan and sums which
remain unutilizable during one budget year can be utilized during the next
year contrary to the usual procedure. The income from the additional services
can be utilized for all kinds of improvements and for incentives to the
personnel. 29
Though Soviet books and newspapers are relatively inexpensive,
popularpublications bring major profits to their parent bodies. This is
a result of several contributing factors. Soviet publications are printed
usually on low quality paper and newsprint is inexpensive. Because of lack
of competition and low esthetic standards, there is no need in major invest-
ments for the constant renewal of the printing facilities. Many of the
printing plants are old or outdated. Labor costs are low and the number
of personnel in Soviet newspapers are not very great. There is an immense
mass market for the major central publications, especially in the Russian
language. Specialized major journals catering to a particular group of the
population print many million copies. For example, the two journals for
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women, Rabotnitsa (The Working Woman) and Krest'yanka (The Peasant Woman),
print together 18 million copies (12 and 6 respectively). 3 0
We have no detailed data about the incomes of Soviet newspapers.
According to a former correspondent of the Literaturnaya gazeta, there were
only 150 people employed at this popular weekly which sells 1.5 million
copies at 20 kopeks per copy. The total production and distribution costs
amounted to a minor fraction of the total income of the paper. The news-
paper transferred the great majority of its income to its parent body, the
Union of Writers of the USSR. Part of this sum was given by this body to the
Litfond (Literary Fund), an agency of the union, catering to the needs of
the writers, and part was left for investment in the newspaper and other
enterprises of the union. A certain amount of the income is transferred
to the government. These sums are not officially regarded as a tax; and
the government, in turn, transfers certain sums from its budget for the
needs of the Writers Union and its members.3 1
In the research institutes of the Ministry of Communications
independent accounting was introduced in January 1962. The income of such
institutes comes from three sources: (a) the state budget (to cover basic
investments and research work of importance to the country as a whole);
(b) income from client organizations, such as other ministries and agencies
which conclude contracts with the institutes for a certain piece of research;
(c) and the Ministry of Communications itself for work done for the needs of
its own agencies and sub-units. The plan for 1969 envisaged 19%, 37% and
44% respectively from the various sources of income. Upon signing a con-
tract with a client organization the research institute has the right to
receive an advance payment of up to 25% of the total. For example the
participation of the postal enterprises in the cost of the letter-carrier
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can be raised from the norm of 30% to 75%. The communications enterprise
is allowed to buy with its additional income, equipment necessary to make
the work more easy, such as automobiles and bicycles. The profit can also
be invested in improving housing and in environmental needs. Additional
services include advertising facilities made available both to organizations
and citizens, as well as special forms of parcel and message deliveries.
It is not clear from the material available whether such additional services
can compete with the main activities of the communications organizations
and cause them some losses. 3 2
While the great majority of Soviet communications equipment is
produced in the USSR, there is a growing connection with foreign countries.
Some of the most modern printing and communications equipment in the USSR
is imported from countries such as West Germany, Switzerland, FinlAnd,
Canada and countries of the Comecon. Some of the Soviet journals -- especi-
ally those for foreign consumption and for the Soviet elite -- are being
printed in Finland, Hungary and Bulgaria. The USSR is a partner in the
intervision network comprised of the Communist countries of Eastern Europe.
It also exchanges programs with Eurovision. Soviet books, periodicals,
and films are being exported abroad as well as supplied without pay to
foreign countries and organizations and to developing countries in parti-
cular. In the way of cultural aid Jordan television is showing films on
Soviet ballet and uses Soviet newsreels for its news programs. Soviet
organizations also provide various services of media to communist parties
in other countries.3 3
E
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Footnotes
Note: Sources quoted more than once are referred to by an abbreviated
title. For full reference, see the bibliography.
Section A
1. This revolution has been described in a number of studies, quoted in
the bibliography. It has been studied by the Comcom project at the
Center for International Studies at M.I.T. during 1963-1969. It was
summed up in its final report, see Pool, 1969 and 1973. See also
Hollander (1972) and Hopkins (1970).
2. Data in this section are from Transport i svyaz, 1972, pp. 271, 274-302;
Nar. khoz., 1922-1972, pp. 52-53, 313; Nar. knoz., 1972, pp. 174-175,
461-464; Nar. khoz., 1973, pp. 531-532, 631. See also Rogers, 1969 and
1971.
3. E.g., the volumes of the 1970 census (Itogi, 1970), the latest Soviet
statistical yearbooks, etc. See below Footnotes #4, 6, and 9.
4. Nar. khoz., 1972, p. 462.
5. Izvestia, May 7, 1974, p. 6. Nar.khoz., 1972, p. 462.
6. Nar. khoz., 1922-1972, p. 373. Nar. khoz., 1973, p. 631.
7. Nar. khoz., 1972, pp. 174-175, and 1973, pp. 220-221.
8. Agitator, No. 6, 1974, back cover; Trud, May 7, 1974, p. 3; Kommunist
Tadzhikistana, May 7, 1974, p. 3.
9. Data below are from Transport i svyaz, 1972, pp. 281 and 189.
10. Ibid. Also Itogi, VII, 1970, p. 206. And see Nar. khoz., 1973, pp.
531-532.
11. Nar. khoz., 1972, p. 314.
12. Transport i svyaz, 1972, p. 279; Nar. khoz., 1922-1972, pp. 313-314
and 373; Nar. khoz., 1972, p. 461; Nar. khoz., 1973, pp. 531-532, 631.
13. "Near completemonopoly of control in the hands of the Party and of the
government, of all means of effective mass communication was included
as one of the six basic traits of a totalitarian dictatorship." See
C. Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Auto-
cracy (New York: Praeger), 1960, pp. 21-22. It seems that in the
subsequent discussion about totalitarianism this particular feature
was not altered.
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14. Inkeles, 1971, p. 265, does discuss channels of feedback from the
population upwards to the authorities, such as a) clandestine expressions,
b) reports of "agitators," c) letters to the editor, etc.
15. Cf., G. Skilling and F. Griffiths, eds., Interest Groups in Soviet
Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U.P.), 1971.
16. The material in this section is based on interviews with former
writers for Lit. gaz. and other former media people in Moscow, Leningrad,
Dushanbe, Novosibirsk, Baku, Tbilisi, etc.
17. Subscription for this weekly went up from 377,000 in 1968 to 1,428,000
in 1972. See Lit. gaz., No. 1, 1972, p. 1.
18. Novy Mir., No. 1, 1972. The number of libraries alone was 129,100 in
1972. See Nar. khoz., 1972, p. 657. For changes in the circulation
of Oktyabr. see this journal, Nos. 5 (1970), 1 (1972), and 1 (1973).
19. Interviews with recent smigrds.
20. See e.g., Ilana Dimant-Kass, 1) "Pravda and Trud: Divergent Soviet
Attitudes Towards the Middle East," Soviet Union (Pittsburgh), Vol. 1,
Part I, and 2) "Soviet Foreign Policy Formulation: The Case-Study
of Involvement in the Front Line Arab States, 1966-73," Ph.D. Disser-
tation, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, December 1975 (mimeo, Hebrew).
And C. Duevel, "Pravda and Izvestia at Odds on Future Course in
Foreign and Domestic Policy," Radio Liberty Research, RL 23/75,
January 7, 1975.
21. Sovetskaya Litva, September 15, 1972, p. 4. And see Sovetskaya kultura and
Ekonomiecheskaya gazeta for the respective periods.
22. This section is based on Gosplan, 1972, passim, and interviews with
emigres.
23. See Gos. plan, 1972, pp. 16-64.
24. Ibid., pp. 216-218 and 315-319.
25. Ibid., pp. 315-319.
26. Schramm, in D. Lerner and W. Schramm, eds., Communications and
Change in the Developing Countries (Honolulu: East-West Center),
1967, pp. 5-32.
27. See Section A, IV., VI., and Section B, I. and V.
28. Interviews with 6migres. And see M. Lisann, The Politics of Broad-
casting to the USSR, Ph.D. dissertation, John Hopkins University,
Washington, D.C., 1973 (unpublished).
29. Gos. plan, 1972, pp. 316-317. The richly colored Soviet Life, the
representative journal of the USSR for US readers, is printed by
Fawcett, Rockville, Maryland.
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30. See these publications, especially since 1970.
31. See e.g., Tiesa, November 12, 1972, p. 1. "The Uzbek republican
radio increased its news bulletins from 8 to 12 a day," Kommunist
Uzbekistana, 7, 1970, pp. 63-69.
32. Examples were the Watergate affair and the case of the Ma'alot massacre
incident in Israel. During a considerable time Soviet media ignored
the matter completely, while world media were saturated with the news.
A brief (greatly distorted) account appeared in the Soviet media after
these matters came to a close.
33. See Section B, I. Some 2,000 factories have newspapers of their own,
and about 6 million workers, kolkhoz members and others are rabselkory,
i.e., volunteer correspondents for Soviet newspapers. Trud, May 5,
1974, p. 1. A former Soviet director, who made a film showing how
Soviet security agencies caught Western spies who had been parachuted
into Soviet territory, reported in talks with the author that he
received all kinds of support and encouragement from top security
officials in Moscow.
34. Censorship is one of the central issues in the struggle of the Demo-
cratic Movement in the USSR and has been widely discussed by specialists
in the West. See e.g., "The Soviet Censorship (A Symposium)," Studies
on the Soviet Union (Munich), New Series, Vol. XI, No. 2, 1971; M.
Dewhirst and R. Farrel, eds., The Soviet Censorship (Metuchen, New
York: Scarecrow Press), 1973; P. Reddaway, ed., Uncensored Russia
(New York: American Heritage Press), 1972; Medvedev, 1972. In
addition, publications at higher levels supervise those at a lower
level. This control can be rather effective. See e.g., Gazeta, 1972,
pp. 148-149; Zhurnalist, 3, 1974, p. 4.
35. See e.g., Khruschev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown), 1970, Chapters
7, 8 and Appendix 4. A high measure of integration of media in the
Party is achieved through including editors in Party bodies. See
e.g., Gazeta, 1972, p. 100.
36. 0 pechati, 1954, pp. 173, 180-181.
37. BSE, 1972, 9, pp. 732-733.
38. Hazan, 1972, pp. 11-12; and cf., Hazan, 1976, passim.
39. Interviews with recent 6migres, formerly employed in media.
40. Vladimirov, 1968, pp. 73-107.
41. Interviews with emigres.
42. See Hopkins, 1970, Section V, p. 1.; Hollander, 1972; passim; Vladimirov,
1968, pp. 79-107.
43. Ibid. And interviews with Soviet expatriates.
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44. A. Solzhenitzyn, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, Introduction
by M. Hayward and L. Lebedz (New York: Praeger), 1970.
45. Hopkins, 1970, pp. 1-6.
46. Sovetskaya Rossiya, September 19, 1969. Kommunist (Erevan, Armenia),
August 26, 1969.
47. The most famous recent case was that of Solzhenitsyn who had been
expelled from the Union of Soviet Writers.
48. Kultura i zhyttya, January 30, 1972, pp. 1 and 3, and February 13,
1972, p. 3. Literature Ukrainy, April 11, 1972, p. 4.
49. Materials in this section are taken from: BSE Yezhegodnik, 1973;
Portraits, 1968; Prominent Personalities, 1968, p. 752; Pravda, April
25, 1970; Kommunist (Armenia), August 26, 1969; and from interviews.
And see Zhurnalist, 4, 1971, p. 79, for the career of P.F. Alekseev,
editor of Sovetskaya Rossiya. Also Zhurnalist, 6, 1971, p-. 77, for
data on several top media people. For the latest list of top media
managers in government and state institutions see Digest, August 21,
1974, pp. 10-13.
50. Of 534 delegates to the Congress of the Journalists' Union (in 1971),
527 were members of the CPSU. Zhurnalist, 1, 1972, p. 2.
51. For the training of Soviet journalists, see "Soviet Journalist Cadres:
A Multi-Indicator Analysis," Center for International Studies, M.I.T.,
Project: Sociology of Soviet Audiences, Reference Report 3, July-
August, 1972.
52. Vedomosti VerkhovnogoSoveta SSSR, March 31, 1971, p. 201.
53. Vladimirov, 1968, pp. 80-83. "A special correspondent is the paper's
ambassador, and the paper's public image depends to a large extent
on the impression which he makes on the people," L. Tolkunov (chief
editor of Izvestia), in Zhurnalist, 10, 1971, pp. 32-35. A recent
emigre related that when he had been a special correspondent of a
central Moscow paper in a republic, he had easy access even to the
republican KGB head.
54. Zhurnalist, June 1970, pp. 26-28.
55. Such illegal radio hams are labelled "radio hooligans," See e.g.,
Kommunist Tadzhikistana, November 10, 1972, p. 4. And see Vedomosti
Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, August 16, 1972, pp. 470-471; Sovetskaya
Kirgiziya, August 22, 1972, p. 4.
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Section B
1. See Section A, IV. and footnotes there.
2. See publications such as: BSE, Yezhegodnik, Sovetskaya pechat, Pravda,
August 5, 1972.
3. See e.g., the journal Raspostraneniye pechati (Moscowmonthly).
4. Pravda, August 2, 1972, p. 6 and August 5, 1972.
5. See Section A, I.
6. Spravochnik, 1971, pp. 149-150, 168-170. The Soviets regard radio as
"the invention of our countryman A. Popov." See e.g., Izvestia, May 7,
1972, p. 6.
7. Spravochnik, 1971, p. 170.
8. Material in this section is from Trud, May 7, 1974, p. 3; Izvestia,
May 7, 1974, p. 2; SWB, SU/W785, July 19, 1974, p. Bl; and talks
with dmigre's.
9. Consult the schedules for radio and television in the central Soviet
newspapers such as Pravda and Izvestia. TV programs for schools have
greatly developed since 1965. See Uchitelskaya gazeta, August 21, 1971,
p. 2. .
10. Talks with 6migres.
11. Cf., Agitator, 6, 1974, back cover; Nar. khoz., 1972, p. 462. The
Soviets claim Russian parentage for television: "Already at the
beginning of the 20th century, the Russian engineer B. Rozing had
laid the foundation of television in Petersburg by developing the
cathode ray tube idea and its design." Cina, May 31, 1973, p. 4.
12. Izvestia, May 7, 1972, p. 6. Color programs were at first broadcast
from Moscow, Leningrad, Novosibirsk, Sverdlovsk and Gorky. SWB, SU/
W777, May 24, 1974, p. Bl. In Kazakhstan, Pravda and Izvestia are
printed in three cities: Alma-Ata, Karaganda and Tselinograd. See
Kaz. pravda, September 1, 1972, p. 3. The Uzbek TV center relays
color transmissions from Moscow, Kiev and Tbilisi: Pravda vostoka,
May 7, 1971, p. 3.
13. Agitator, 6, 1974, back cover. In 1972 only 60% of Moldavia was
reached by Channel 1 and only 15% by Channel 2. Sov. Moldaviya,
September 30, 1971, p. 2; and January 14, 1972, p. 3.
14. Talks with emigr~s. However, delivery of mail by air is expanding.
In Kazakhstan, mail is sent by air to all provincial centers and 274
sovkhozy and settlements, Kaz. pravda, September 1, 1971, p. 2.
15. Evidence from 6migr6s.
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16. Sovetskaya Moldaviya, February 22, 1972.
17. Soviet Weekly, May 12, 1973, p. 3. BSE, Yezhegodnik, 1973.
18. BSE, Yezhegodnik, 1973, pp. 26 and 97. In 1972, there were 129,000
"mass libraries" in the USSR, and any serious library would be unthink-
able without this outstanding publication. Zhurnalist, 1, 1972, pp. 2-33.
And consult Za Rubezhom (Moscow, weekly).
19. Zhurnalist, 1, 1972, pp. 20-27.
20. For publications of public organizations, see e.g., BSE, Yezhegodnik,
1974 under the sections devoted to each organization.
21. Zhurnalist, 1, 1972, pp. 22-23; Spravochnik, 1971, pp. 64, 129; BSE,
1972, Vol. 9, p. 739.
22. Spravochnik, 1971, pp. 104-129.
23. Ibid., and talks with imigr6s.
24. Lit. gaz., 25 April 1973, p. 12.
25. Sources for this section: Transport i svyza', 1972; Finansy...svyazi,
1970; Gos. plan, 1972, pp. 216-218, 315-319, 351-352; Raspostranenie
pechati, 1972-1975.
26. See e.g., Kaz. pravda, February 2, 1972, p. 2: A check on the
subscriptions taken by various organizations in Kazakhstan brought
to light widespread abuse of public funds. In one sovkhoz kindergarden,
no childrens' magazines were being received, but USSR Supreme Soviet
Gazette and other official papers were.
27. Interview with an emigre.
28. Finansy... svyazi, 1970, pp. 124-132.
29. Ibid., pp. 80-83, 93-95.
30. BSE, Yezhegodnik, 1974.
31. Interview with an Emigre.
32. Finansy...svyazi, 1970, pp. 104-106.
33. Ibid., p. 91. And emigre evidence.
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